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with a country, let it be good relations. 
But not in the sense that Australia 
should bend itself backwards and 
pretend not to know what is going on 
here." Slamat points out that by com­
prom ising its  own values and 
opinions, A u stralia  risks losing 
respect in the eyes of Indonesia. "I will 
not mention names," he says, "but one 
of your ambassadors has made him­
self ridiculous here in Indonesia by 
trying to be more Javanese than the 
average Indonesian. He thinks he is 
helping the situation. But looking at it 
from, let us say, an oriental point of 
view, we feel he should not humiliate 
himself like that."
Clearly, neither this approach, nor 
taking a soft stand on human rights is 
what "being part of Asia" should 
mean. A more subtle attitude is re­
quired. In d o n esia  poet and 
playwright, W S Rendra, when in 
Australia on his recent tour, expressed 
well the fine line between criticism 
and interference: "We don't like politi­
cal pressure. It's wrong and useless.
D uring his recent prim e m inisterial visit to Indonesia, 
Paul Keating was at 
pains to emphasise positive 
aspects of the Australia-In- 
donesia relationship. Accord­
ingly, he reiterated  the
But there is no need to give political 
encouragement to our wrongdoings 
either." For Australia, political pres­
sure such as the threat of stopping aid 
or imposing economic sanctions over 
Dili would have achieved nothing, 
nor would it in the future if a similar 
incident occurred. This is not simply 
because Indonesia clearly takes a 
pride in its refusal to be dictated to by 
other countries, but also because 
neither Japan (which supplies In­
donesia with almost two-thirds of its 
aid) nor the US will pull out their 
economic support and investment in 
Indonesia.
What Australia can do is to try to en­
courage the Indonesian government 
to adopt a policy which acknowledges 
cultural differences and local values, 
not only in East Timor, but also in Irian 
Jaya and Aceh. Most importantly of 
all, Australia needs to look at human 
rights in the context of Indonesia's 
political and economic development. 
Rendra stresses the need for gradual 
change to achieve true democracy and
Inside
Out
long-established government 
view that the stable and prag­
matic New Order government 
of President Soeharto was of 
immense strategic benefit to 
Australia. But this sanguine 
view  of the Soeharto  
governm ent's stability may
human rights in Indonesia: "In the 
process of gradual change you must 
still reach consensus with the elite. 
Because those who fight for human 
rights and dem ocracy are still a 
minority."
Rather than only addressing human 
rights issues that hit the front pages, 
Australia could play a more sig­
nificant role in areas such as education 
and the improvement of Indonesia's 
overw orked in frastru ctu re . 
Democracy and human rights are not 
solely dependent on political or 
economic change—cultural change is 
also fundamental, and that requires 
p atience and assistan ce from 
countries such as Australia. Keating 
has made the first move at a political 
level. Now this needs to be followed 
up by a multitude of interchanges at a 
personal level.
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shortly require reassessment 
because Indonesia seems to be 
standing at, or at least ap­
proaching, a sign ifican t  
crossroads.
Although the 71-year old Soeharto is 
almost certain to be elected unop­
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia is predicated 
on the ‘stability’ achieved in the Soeharto era. As 
this period draws to a close, the role of Islam is one 
of the biggest imponderables in an uncertain future, 
says Steven Drakeley.
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posed to another five-year term when 
the People's Consultative Council 
(MPR) meets next year, his rule must 
be approaching its end, if only be­
cause of his age. Barely  muted 
speculation already abounds in In­
donesia as to what changes will take 
place when the presidency does 
change hands (for only the second 
tim e since in d ep endence) and 
whether the transition to a post- 
Soeharto era will be smooth or tur­
bulent
A large number of factors will interact 
to determine the direction of political 
developments. One of these is the 
pivotal role that Islamic forces could 
play, as they have in previous political 
transitions. For centuries, Islam has 
had an influential role in Indonesian 
political affairs. It would be surprising 
if this were not the case, given that the 
overwhelming m ajority of the In­
donesian p op u lation  have long 
professed the Islam ic faith  (ap­
proximately 87% according to figures 
released a decade ago).
Yet Indonesia is not an Islamic state. 
Indeed, Islam has been characterised 
as a political 'outsider' throughout its 
history in Indonesia, and Indonesian 
Muslims have been described as a 
'majority with a minority mentality'. 
Certainly, Islam appears to have con­
tinued to occupy a political 'outsider' 
position throughout the New Order 
period, despite being a crucial politi­
cal midwife at its birth. But is this now 
about to change?
There is no doubt that in the social and 
religious spheres, Islam has made 
spectacular strides in the last 20 years, 
and the pace seems to be accelerating, 
particularly among young people. 
Vivid testimony is provided to the 
casual observer by the preponderance 
of young women now choosing to 
wear a variant of Islamic female attire, 
the jilbab (a headscarf which covers 
the hair, neck and shoulders, leaving 
only the face exposed). As a recent 
issue of the influential weekly In­
donesian magazine, Tempo, acknow­
ledged in a major article, the process 
of 'santriisation' is making great 
strides. (Santri is a term used to refer 
to those who practice a more orthodox 
variant of Islam, their counterparts, 
the 'nom inal M uslim s' are often 
referred to as abangan.) This process, 
more commonly called islamisation, 
can only result in Islam gaining con­
siderable social weight. Can this in­
creased social weight be prevented 
from manifesting itself politically?
Perhaps the clearest indication that it 
cannot, is revealed by the new stance 
that Soeharto seems to have adopted 
towards Islam. He and members of his 
family have taken considerable pains 
to display more orthodox Islamic be­
haviour in the last couple of years, 
culminating in their much publicised 
performance of the Haj (pilgrimage to 
Mecca) last year. This is especially sig­
nificant since hitherto Soeharto was 
reputed to incline strongly towards 
Kejawert (a blend of mystical Islam and 
pre-Islam ic Javanese traditional 
beliefs).
Other more tangible pro-Islam initia­
tives have also been taken recently. 
Substantial funds have been allocated 
to Islamic projects such as the building 
of mosques and other facilities, the 
authority of religious courts has been 
boosted, greater emphasis has been 
given to Islamic teachings in the na­
tional curriculum, Muslim girls (after 
years of agitation) are now allowed to 
wear jilbabs in school, and a govern­
ment sponsored Association of Mus­
lim Intellectuals (ICMI) has been 
established, as has the country's first 
Islamic-style bank.
The government was also quick to 
side w ith those M uslim s who 
demanded action be taken against the 
hapless ed itor of the Monitor, a 
popular newspaper which recently 
ran foul of Islamic sensibilities. The 
editor was sentenced to five years in 
jail for blasphemy and the Monitor’s 
publishing licence withdrawn. Now, 
in response to these overtures, most 
Islam ic organisations have 
vociferously called for Soeharto's 
election to a sixth five-year term, 
going so far as to hold a mass prayer 
in the capital with that objective. Does 
this mean that Islam has finally 
crossed the threshold and become a 
political 'insider'? An answer can only 
be attem pted from a h istorical 
perspective.
Islam in Indonesia is far from being 
uniform. As Islam spread throughout 
the islands that became Indonesia, it 
was adapted in an interactive process 
with the prevailing local customs, 
traditions and beliefs. To a large ex­
tent, these local differences, which can 
be found throughout the Islamic
world, are inconsequential. But for 
reasons which are not entirely clear 
there developed a cleavage within the 
Indonesia Islamic community based 
on quite different levels of commit­
ment to orthodoxy.
This helps explain the apparent 
paradox of a religion which is adhered 
to by an overwhelming proportion of 
the population, yet which is described 
as a political outsider, and is regarded, 
and at times has seemed even to 
regard itself, as a minority religion. 
This is so because it is really  
'orthodox' Islam which occupies this 
'outsider' position. Islamic orthodoxy 
is not (or at least was not) accepted by 
the majority of Indonesian Muslims. 
Moreover, the santri variant of Islam 
was for the most part rejected by the 
traditional ruling elite of Java, who 
preferred a sophisticated version of 
abangan beliefs..
But other factors too have played an 
important part in the development 
and maintenance of this paradox, not 
least the policies of Indonesia 's 
colonial rulers. Although the Dutch 
resisted any temptations to attempt 
the full-scale Christian conversion of 
Indonesia, they preferred to work and 
rule through traditional rulers who 
were either non-Islamic or less com­
mitted to Islamic orthodoxy. Dutch 
policy and practice contributed to the 
creation of Indonesian Islam's charac­
ter as an 'outsider', and helped to en­
sure that th is ch aracter would 
continue into the post-colonial era. It 
did so in two main ways. Firstly, 
Dutch policy heightened the existent 
animosity between the traditional 
ruling groups, supported by Dutch 
power, and Islamic religious leaders 
who were suspected and constrained 
by that same power.
Secondly, belated Dutch attempts to 
produce a western-educated elite to 
staff the colonial bureaucracy helped 
to ensure the developm ent of a 
secular-minded independence move­
ment. Overwhelmingly, the tiny few 
who received a western education 
were drawn from the traditional 
ruling elites and were thus on the 
whole predisposed against Islamic or­
thodoxy, an inclination which their 
western education would have done 
little to dispel. It was from the ranks of 
this western-educated elite that most 
of Indonesia's nationalist political
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leaders stepped to lead Indonesia to 
independence.
Although m any of the 'secu lar 
nationalists' were Muslims, some 
even quite devout, they accepted a 
'church-state' division, seeing it as in­
dispensable to the creation of a 
modern nation state. This attitude 
placed them in a position of fun­
damental opposition with the 'Islamic 
nationalists' for whom the estab­
lishment of an Islamic state was the 
ultimate objective. The independent 
state which was established in 1945 
was effectively secular, although face 
was saved for the Islamic nationalists 
by the inclusion of 'Belief in God' as 
the first principle in the five principled 
state ideology known as Pancasila.
The post-independence m ilitary- 
political leadership around Soeharto 
was unsympathetic towards Islamic 
political am bitions— not without 
some justification. Islam was now the 
only intact civilian political force 
capable of posing any challenge to 
New Order authority, precisely be­
cause Islam  rem ains ultim ately 
beyond the ability of the state to con­
trol. But if the New Order regime has 
been about anything during its 25 
years in power, it has been about es­
tablishing, in the name of develop­
ment and stability, an unprecedented 
degree of social control. Accordingly, 
Islam bore the brunt of state efforts to 
construct a top-down political system 
with severely limited scope both for 
civ ilian  input into the political 
process.
Since the Pancasila is held to include 
all that is legitimately Indonesian, it 
follows that anything deemed to be 
outside of its embrace is illegitimate in 
the Indonesian context, and hence 
deserving of repression or expulsion. 
Furthermore, since the Pancasila is 
wholly inclusive, then in a system of 
'Pancasila d em ocracy ', legitim ate 
political debate can proceed only from 
the basis of an absolute shared accep­
tance of the Pancasila. This acceptance 
also im plies a rejection  of 
'oppositionist' behaviour (a concept 
which includes the practice of western 
dem ocracy) because Pancasila 
democracy is based on the principle of 
a consensus w hich em braces 
everybody. Therefore, those who raise 
the banner of Islam as a political ideol­
ogy are seen to have automatically 
placed them selves outside the
legitim ate political process and 
beyond the philosophical pale which 
inspires it.
Furthermore, the government does 
not regard its policy as aimed at ex­
cluding Islam from the political 
process. On the contrary, it is aimed at 
the complete incorporation of Islam 
into the legitimate political process. 
Since Islam is an integral part of In­
donesian society, then it must become 
a reconciled  member of the In­
donesian family and take its allotted 
place in the political process of Pan­
casila democracy. This, ipso facto, 
means Islam jettisoning its identity as 
a separate political entity and with it 
its traditional penchant (as a political 
outsider) for providing a pole of at­
traction for oppositionist tendencies.
By the late 1980s, it appeared that the 
New Order had succeeded in 'taming' 
Islam politically. Its political repre­
sentation had shrunk to a shadow of 
its former self. All Islamic organisa­
tions now accepted the primacy of the 
Pancasila and Islamic energies seemed 
primarily directed into the 'safe' areas 
of religious and social activities. It is 
against this background that the 
recent government behaviour with 
regard to Islam must be understood.
In terms of gestures, Soeharto has cer­
tainly made a dramatic shift. Nor 
should gestures be underestimated, 
especially in the Indonesian context 
where a great deal of politics is played 
out at the symbolic level. But nothing 
has substantially altered in the New 
Order's attitude towards the political 
place of Islam. Independent political 
activity by Islamic forces, particularly 
that which mobilises Muslims as Mus­
lims, is as frowned upon as ever.
However, it may be that the govern­
ment has misjudged the situation by 
giving the mass-based, religious/so­
cial Islamic organisations greater 
freedom to intervene in specific politi­
cal questions, albeit cautiously and 
from within the parameters of the 
sanctioned discourse. The prime ex­
ample of this is the major Islamic con­
tribution to the general debate over 
democratisation and political open­
ness. There is now a huge potential for 
further Islamic involvement in ques­
tions which concern growing num­
bers of Indonesians, such as land 
rights, wages and labour conditions, 
and human rights in general. Should
Islamic forces become involved on a 
larger scale in these issues, then cer­
tainly the government would be hard 
pressed to contain the situation 
without making substantial conces­
sions or resorting to large-scale 
repression.
Australians' knowledge about In­
donesia, and especially Indonesian 
Islam, is limited. Irrational fears about 
populous Asian nations on the one 
hand, and Islam on the other, are dif­
ficult to counter, and episodes such as 
the closure of the Monitor only tend to 
encourage them. The M onitors crime 
was to print the results of a reader 
survey in which readers nominated 
the person they most admired. In this 
ranking the prophet Mohammed ap­
peared in eleventh place behind 
various political figures and popular 
personalities such as the pop star 
Iwan Fals. This was regarded as blas­
phemous since it seemed to be com­
paring the prophet with ordinary 
human beings. Some Indonesian 
Muslims called for the death penalty.
This is one side of Indonesian Islam, 
but that there is another side is evident 
from the fact that many devout Mus­
lims vociferously opposed the Monitor 
closure. Indeed, the Monitor affair was 
the catalyst which led to the founding 
of the barely tolerated Democracy 
Forum , a loose association  of 
prominent and courageous intellec­
tuals, chaired by Abdurrahm an 
Wahid, which aims at the promotion 
of democracy.
Although it is impossible to predict 
the future direction that Indonesia 
will take, significant changes are quite 
likely before the end of this century 
and Islam will undoubtedly play a 
major role in them. It is not impossible 
that Indonesia will become more 
democratic and politically open, and 
Indonesian Islam could certainly be a 
major contributor to this process. Such 
a development could only bode well 
for Australia, since it is the difference 
between our respective political cul­
tures which is the underlying cause of 
much of the recurrent friction in the 
Australia-Indonesia relationship.
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